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### STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

### HOW CAN SWEDEN ORGANIZE AND MAINTAIN A RAPID REACTION FORCE AS A MEMBER OF NATO?

BY

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#### **ABSTRACT**

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In Sweden, there has been a discussion about future Swedish defense policy since the Cold War ended and Sweden joined the European Union (EU). Many voices have been heard saying Sweden should join NATO, especially after NATO has changed its policy to take a more active part in peace support operations, such as in Bosnia. This essay and its discussion make the controversial assumption that Sweden will become a member of NATO and, as a consequence of this assumption, that Sweden will need to organize a rapid reaction land force. The essay will analyze possible alternative solutions when organizing and maintaining a Swedish rapid reaction force. It will first, briefly describe the NATO organization and the new military orientation of NATO. Secondly, a short summary will follow of how Denmark, Germany and Norway have organized their new respective rapid reaction forces. Finally, possible Swedish alternatives will be discussed and a suggested solution will be described.

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# How Can Sweden Organize and Maintain a Rapid Reaction Force as a Member of NATO?

In Sweden, there has been a discussion about future Swedish defense policy since the Cold War ended, and Sweden joined the European Union (EU). Many voices have been heard saying Sweden should join NATO, especially after NATO has changed its strategy and to take a more active part in peace support operations such as in Bosnia. Others claim that Sweden has already left its tradition of neutrality by becoming a member of the EU, and thereby requiring it to adopt a new security and defense policy. The official Swedish position remains unchanged. Sweden will maintain its defense policy based on military non-alignment with the aim of keeping Sweden neutral in the event of war.

This paper is not meant to be a discussion of whether Sweden shall join NATO or not, or if Sweden should change its defense policy. Rather the purpose of this essay is to discuss some important factors for the Swedish Government and authorities to assess should Sweden decide to request membership in NATO. This essay and its discussion makes the controversial assumption that Sweden will become a member of NATO. And, as a consequence of this assumption, that Sweden will need to organize a rapid reaction land force. The pros and cons of a Swedish membership is an ongoing and lively debate, and hopefully this essay will contribute, in a small way to this debate. This contribution will be limited to the question: "How to organize and maintain a Swedish rapid reaction force?" The discussion will concentrate on the main factors which should be considered.

The paper will analyze possible alternative solutions when organizing and maintaining a Swedish rapid reaction force. It will first, briefly describe the NATO organization and the new military orientation of NATO. Secondly, a short summary will follow of how Denmark, Germany and Norway have organized their new respective rapid reaction forces, with the view of condensing important factors these governments considered in this establishment. Finally, these factors and considerations will frame the structure for the discussion of possible Swedish alternatives.

#### NATO's Organization and Requirements for New Members.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective defense alliance based on the principles of political and military cooperation among independent member countries. As stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, Alliance members are committed to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.<sup>1</sup>

NATO's 1991 New Strategic Concept outlines the Alliance's new orientation and details how NATO forces need to change to meet these new challenges. Alliance forces and structures must be able to deal with a large variety of contingencies, including crisis management and crisis prevention operations. The conflict spectrum now extends from defending a member country to engaging in humanitarian missions.

The alliance's new orientation after the Cold War included reduced dependency on nuclear weapons and introduced some changes in NATO's integrated military structure.

The need for a more flexible, versatile, mobile, and adaptable command structure for national forces was recognized. The creation of the Allied Command Europe (ACE)

Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was initiated to meet these new requirements. Included in the new concept is the goal of eventually changing the NATO integrated command structure to streamline it and to make it more adaptable to the new security situation in Europe. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces was introduced at the NATO Summit meeting in Brussels 1994 and recently adopted, in principle at the June 1996 Berlin Ministerials. This command structure and other NATO assets could be made available for either NATO nations or the Western European Union (WEU).

NATO Reaction Forces are highly mobile on ground, in air and on sea. They are also very versatile and maintained at the highest level of readiness. Therefore, they can be used on short notice for crisis response. Two kinds of reaction forces are available to NATO, first the Immediate Reaction Forces and secondly the Rapid Reaction Forces. Both consist of Land, Air and Maritime components, although they are not yet fully joint. The Land component of these NATO forces is called the Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) and the Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

The enlargement of NATO must consider not only the Treaty's basic values of collective defense and democracy, but also how to preserve the effectiveness of the organization. Article 10 in the North Atlantic Treaty states "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty." New membership will be evaluated on a case by case basis. Decisions will be taken on the basis of consensus, after discussion and consultation among the member nations. Important factors in this evaluation are the country's ability

to contribute to the collective defense and demonstrate the ability to meet basic values.

There is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting a new member.

Nevertheless, the following common requirements of a prospective member country should be extracted. The forces the country makes available to NATO must be capable of a degree of interoperability with other NATO forces and capable of operations within the NATO command structure. The forces must be able to be deployed to the territory of other member countries, and have adequate logistic support. "Each member country is responsible for ensuring, individually or through cooperative arrangements, the continuous support of its own forces. Coordinated logistics planning is therefore an essential aspect of the efficient and economical use of resources." The prospective country conversely must be prepared for NATO deployments on its own territory. Prospective members, therefore must have forces that are organized, trained, equipped and maintained to meet the requirements of sustainment, interoperability, readiness, flexibility and mobility to participate in a Rapid Reaction Force for NATO's force structure.

Denmark, Germany and Norway are all members of NATO and have recently reorganized their Armies to better meet the requirements of the Alliance's new orientation. The respective governments faced the challenge to participate in both collective defense (Article 5 operations) and collective security (non-Article 5 operations, i.e., mostly peace support operations). NATO governments recognized the need for immediately available forces, rapid reaction forces to be employed in either Article 5 or non-Article 5 operations. The study of these countries' solutions gives valuable inputs to

the discussion of Swedish possibilities. The following paragraphs will shortly summarize the different countries solutions.

## Denmark's Organization of an International Brigade, The Danish Reaction Brigade. (Den Danske Internationale Brigade)

The Danish Reaction Brigade,<sup>4</sup> was organized 1 July 1994. The missions of the Brigade are primarily defend the country, secondly be a NATO Rapid Reaction Force, and last be capable of participating in NATO peace support operations. The brigade will be organized with one armored battalion and two mechanized infantry battalions supported by artillery, air defense and logistics units. The Brigade will be deployed within the 1st British Armoured Division, stationed in Germany. Considered as an alternative was a deployment in a German Division, but the wish to broaden the international contacts favored participating in the British Division. The Brigade has a readiness level of seven days for subunits and fifteen days for the Brigade as a whole.

When Denmark participates in peace support operations (non-Article 5 operations), about one battalion of the Brigade is deployed together with, if requested, some military observers. This gives the Brigade HQ the ability to sustain one battalion on operations without requiring additional personnel. Each unit will be deployed about half a year. The thought is that the Brigade shall be possible to use, on short notice and in the initial phase of 4-6 months, later on to be replaced by other, traditional United Nation (UN) units. This decision of replacing the Brigade has to be taken on a case by case evaluation. The Brigade, can in principle be used in Europe, Middle East and North Africa. Smaller units or military observers can be used world wide.

The Brigade will consist of about 4500 soldiers of which 80% will be reservists.

They will have their normal civilian work, but will have a special contract with the Government. The contracted period is three years. The units will be equipped with both armored personnel carriers and main battle tanks, and also equipment for night fighting and mine clearing. The Brigade HQ is collocated with one Regiment in Denmark. The training of the different subunits will be done at other designated Regiments in the Armed Forces which will have the responsibility to provide the Brigade with fully trained and equipped units.

#### The Structure of the German Rapid Reaction Forces.

In line with NATO guidelines, the new force structure concept of the Bundeswehr establishes three force categories; standing reaction forces, the largely mobilization-dependent main defense forces, and the basic military infrastructure of the armed forces. The standing reaction forces will provide both the Rapid Reaction Force for NATO defense and for NATO-led UN peace support operations (non-Article 5 operations). The main defense forces are the main assets to be used to meet an aggressor within the scoop of NATO collective defense.

The German Reaction Forces will consist of five mechanized, light, and air-mobile Brigades. Also included are necessary combat support and combat service support elements, and the German elements of the German-French Brigade. These forces will have 80% professional soldiers and about 20% conscripts. The conscripts are assigned on a voluntary basis and will serve from 12 to 23 months. Subunits shall be ready within 7

days and the main force within 15 to 30 days. The deployment time of these units is half a year when deployed in NATO or UN peace support operations.

#### The Norwegian Rapid Deployment Forces.

Norway has chosen to separate the forces used for UN missions and forces used for NATO missions. <sup>10</sup> The Rapid Reaction Force is the Norwegian contribution to NATO IRF (L). This force consists of one infantry battalion (Telemark battalion) of about 800 soldiers, and is primarily intended for use within NATO Article 5 operations, but can also be used for NATO peace support operations. The conscripts in this force have signed up voluntarily. The professional officers must volunteer to carry out peace support operations to be eligible to join the IRF (L). If the Telemark battalion will be used for peace support operations, by a mandate from UN but under the command of NATO, the NATO standard logistic concept will be used. <sup>11</sup>

The force for UN missions is about 1600 soldiers. This is the UN readiness force. This force consists of one infantry battalion, one engineer company and some supporting units. Also included in this force are about 80 specialists and military observers. The conscripts have to agree to a double volunteership, first they volunteer to join the UN readiness force, and secondly they have to volunteer to take part in the actual UN mission.

The Telemark battalion is available for use in an initial phase of an operation and later on can be replaced by the UN readiness force. Norwegian authorities will consider both the Telemark battalion and the UN readiness force in the same context before deciding which force to deploy. These two units are the only specially trained and

equipped for deployment outside Norway. 12 Priority in deployment is given to missions within the context of NATO defense.

#### Organizing a Swedish Rapid Reaction Force, the SWEDRAP.

From the experiences of the Rapid Reaction Forces in Denmark, Germany and Norway one can find similar questions, topics and factors that these countries had to consider. Specially, the Danish study, which outlined establishing the Danish International Brigade, is very useful to find applicable areas for Sweden. Condensed and adapted, these identified key issues are:

- What is the purpose of a Swedish rapid reaction force, the SWEDRAP? How would it fit in the nation's overall security and defense strategy?
- What kind of missions are expected for this unit to undertake? Has Sweden any specific priorities or limitations?
- How shall the force be organized, trained, equipped and maintained? Is it possible to use conscripts? How can interoperability with NATO be achieved?
- What shall its command structure look like? Its relationship with NATO structures? Which command authorities should be used? What is the preferred chain of command?
  - Who will take decisions to deploy the force?

These questions will form the basic structure for the following discussion. Each will be discussed against possible Swedish applications. In many cases it will not be possible to make any conclusions other than trying to give the range of possibilities. The last part will try to summarize and give a possible Swedish solution.

#### What is the Purpose with and the Mission of the SWEDRAP?

The first, most fundamental question to be considered by the Government is what is the purpose of a Swedish Reaction Force? How does it fit into Swedish security and defense policy? Swedish security policy has both a national and an international dimension. Nationally, Sweden must be able to counter a military threat that directly affects Sweden, the most severe of these being an armed attack directly against Sweden's freedom, independence or sovereign territory. Internationally, Sweden, in collaboration with other countries, actively participates in peace support operations. Thus, the tasks for the Swedish Armed Forces are:

- defend the nation against an armed attack;
- maintain Sweden's territorial integrity;
- be able to carry out international peace operations;
- be used during severe national strains and stresses on the Swedish society in peacetime.

This is the present policy and an assumption is that this policy should basically be valid even after Sweden has joined NATO. What has to be considered, however, is the influence of Article 5 upon these policies. The first task might be changed to include: as an integrated part of NATO, the Armed Forces will defend the nation against an armed attack. The Armed Forces shall be able to receive, support and conduct operations with allied forces.<sup>13</sup>

What kind of missions does a NATO membership impose on Sweden and its forces? NATO requires, in principle, two kind of missions, deriving from collective

defense and collective security. Collective defense is stated in Article 5, <sup>14</sup> "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations gives them the right of individual or collective self-defense. Article 6, of the NATO treaty states the areas of deployment to be the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America as well as to the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. The "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" recognizes collective defense as the maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively. Together with this capability is also the political solidarity it recognizes. Also stated is the primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states. <sup>16</sup>

Collective security, also called non-Article 5 operations, derives from Article 2.

Article 2 states "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations." The New Strategic Concept declares the fundamental security tasks for successful managing of crises. <sup>17</sup> Specifically, it emphasizes Allied consultations on any issues that effect members' vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security. In peace, the role of allied military forces is to guard against risks to security of Alliance members. The Swedish Armed Forces can contribute throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, and can also be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace in missions for the United Nations. <sup>18</sup> In the Multinational Force Command Authorities studies, non-Article 5 operations are defined to include the full spectrum of

operations as described in MC 321, "NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations." These operations are: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. <sup>19</sup> As a summary one can say that missions deriving from collective security are peace support operations. From an overall standpoint this also includes political, economic, social and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defense dimension. Non-Article 5 operations will be performed by NATO forces on request for assistance from the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These operations can be performed as out-of-area operations, that is outside the territories of the member states.

The purpose of a Rapid Reaction Force for Sweden is to have a force available on short notice for defending the country or the territories of member countries which is also capable of use in peace support operations. The organization and maintenance of the SWEDRAP would have to meet NATO requirements and guidelines, as well as support Sweden's security and defense policy.

The missions for the SWEDRAP might be:

- the first available unit to defend the country;
- the Swedish contribution to NATO's ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, ARRC;
- for use in peace support operations.

When the Swedish Government gets a request to participate in a peace support operation it has at least the following alternatives to consider. It can either use the SWEDRAP and accepting a risk in readiness to meet a threat against Swedish territory, or it can specifically organize an ad hoc UN mission force, accepting the time delay of

deployment until the unit is organized, trained and equipped. If a standing UN force with very short reaction time is available, this consequence can be minimized. This kind of force, the SHIRBRIG, is now to be established in Sweden in cooperation with other countries. The third alternative is initially to use the SWEDRAP and later on replace it with specially organized UN forces. The problem is to estimate the duration of the initial phase, and to take the timely decision for replacement. The Government has to balance this with the threat situation and the sustainment capacity built in the SWEDRAP. All alternatives are acceptable and must be evaluated on a case by case decision.

#### How to Organize and Train?

In organizing the unit the first step is to decide upon the missions and the tasks to be accomplished. Also to be decided is the required readiness of the unit. The next step is to combine personnel, equipment and doctrine as optimal as possible. The unit's support requirements must be determined to be harmonized with the missions and tasks. And finally, it must train according to doctrine. This, all together, will form a combat ready unit.

As described above, Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations set the stage for the missions that the SWEDRAP shall accomplish, but what shall the areas of operation be? Shall the Government restrict the SWEDRAP to some specific areas or exclude other areas? Is it possible to support logistically the SWEDRAP outside Central Europe? The basic requirement is sustained deployments in all territories of the member states, as well in Europe as in North America. This requires a well organized transportation capacity and

maintenance capacity. Sweden does not have this capacity today. Other factors, such as climate and terrain conditions will require special training and equipment. Is this achievable with a conscript army or does Sweden need an active unit within the Army? Is it possible financially to balance the present budget combining a conscription and a membership in NATO?

The Danish Government has expressed the preference primarily to use the Danish Reaction Brigade in the central Europe north of the Alps.<sup>21</sup> They also state that the Brigade as a whole can be used in peace support operations in Europe, Middle East and North Africa. Subunits of the Brigade or small teams could be used throughout the world when requested for peace support operations.<sup>22</sup> If Sweden chooses to raise an armored or mechanized brigade as the SWEDRAP, it may express similar preferences, as the Danish for areas of deployment. This will reduce the burden of logistic support in favor for reduced defense costs. If the choice is an infantry brigade the restrictions might be fewer. The final choice has to be taken after discussions with NATO authorities, to find out what kind of unit could be most useful to the Alliance. Does NATO need a unit possible for countering armored assaults or is it better to have a light infantry force possible to be used in cities? Also to be taken in consideration is the possibility to use this force for peace support operations, even if these are secondary missions. Is it better for NATO to have a unit that has flexibility to undertake many different missions but with less capacity than a unit specialized for one type of mission? The choice must be balanced with the domestic requirements of defending the country with as of today a conscript Army or, as other countries as France and the Netherlands have chosen, to have a professional Army.

What size of the force would be appropriate? At a minimum, the size of the force must reflect and support Swedish security policy, and contribute to the overall defense of the Alliance. Germany has five and a half brigades, Denmark has one brigade and Norway has one battalion for NATO missions and one for UN missions. A reasonable force for Sweden could be one well-balanced brigade with sufficient combat service support. The Navy and the Air Force components, heretofore not discussed in this essay, must also be considered when judging the overall support for NATO's collective defense.

How much shall requirements for peace support operations influence the organization and training of the SWEDRAP? As discussed above, the SWEDRAP will always be an option for the Government to choose for peace operations, even if it is not the optimal choice. Peace operations, ranging from humanitarian aid to peacekeeping to peace enforcement, indicate a big variety of tasks to be performed. An assumption is that it is not efficient to train for all these operations during the basic training. This training should concentrate on tasks for normal combat missions, assuming these tasks will be performed in peace enforcement operations as well. The basic training will also form a solid base for complementary training for other kinds of peace support operations. This complementary training could then take place immediately before the unit begins a specific peace support operation, and the training period might vary from a few weeks to maybe several months. A shorter training period is needed for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and conversely, a longer period is required for peace enforcement missions of similar type as the Gulf War. This will, of course, affect the time required for

deployment, but might be an acceptable solution rather than try to train the special skills in the basic training and then sustain these skills.

Sweden has a long tradition of organizing UN forces. These forces are organized on a voluntary basis and are recruited from those soldiers who have done their basic training and returned to their civilian life. These special organized UN forces are separated from the Swedish Armed Forces. In a case of a total mobilization these UN forces have to be withdrawn and the soldiers have to report back to their home units. The Swedish Government has recently declared its willingness to create a High Readiness Brigade together with eight other nations. <sup>23</sup> This SHIRBRIG will be possible to use immediately, but initially restricted to a deployment period of six months. The SHIRBRIG is primarily aimed for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. The SHIRBRIG is not aimed for use within NATO operations, only for UN article 6 missions. The SHIRBRIG and the SWEDRAP will give Sweden a possibility to deploy units for peace support operations on short notice.

How shall the SWEDRAP be used? Shall it be under the command of a British or German Division Commander deployed in the Rapid Reaction Corps ARRC, or some other solution? One option is to organize a Nordic or Baltic Division. Possible interested countries could be Denmark, Finland, Norway, Poland and Sweden. The Baltic States may perhaps be interested in contributing to this division. This possibility is on the assumption that these states, except Denmark and Norway, will be invited to apply for NATO membership and be accepted. A division like this could be potentially effective in a North European scenario. A potential scenario is where the present fragile stability in

Russia develops towards a threat to the Baltic States. This division could probably also have substantial flexibility due to the diversity of contributing countries, despite the obvious limitations. It could also, in the long run, contribute to stability and peace in the northern area. This option of organizing a division in the north is well worth considering.

How will the SWEDRAP be manned, by a militia or active personnel? Is it possible to use conscript soldiers? How shall the readiness be organized? The Swedish Army of today is a kind of militia army, which has a limited number of active duty officers needed for peacetime training and for manning dedicated assignments in wartime. The main part of the officers are in the reserve. All soldiers are conscripts. Sweden has no active duty units only mobilizable units and units undergoing training. Sweden has adopted a special eight year cycle for gradual conversion and renewal of each brigade. Each year a specific number of new conscripts are trained at the same time as the old ones are phased out. Every fourth year the units perform refreshment training of about one month. It is not possible today to use conscripts outside Sweden for combat missions. In Bosnia the Swedish Government permitted specifically the use of Swedish forces under the command of NATO. Such legal questions must be sorted out. Norway has chosen the solution of a double voluntary assignment for participating in operations outside NATO.<sup>24</sup> The soldiers in Denmark will voluntarily sign up for a three year period, including possible deployment abroad.<sup>25</sup>

Is it possible to order an active officer to duty in areas outside Sweden? At present it is not allowed according to the law. The officer has to volunteer. Norway had the same condition but has now changed their law.

Sweden's defense policy is based upon the privilege and duty to defend the country. The conscript system gives this mandatory possibility to all males in Sweden. It is voluntary for females. This means that the Government can mobilize the Armed Forces and the conscripts can be called upon to defend the country. In a true collective sense the Swedish territory should be equaled with NATO countries' territory. If this is so, the present law should be sufficient with some minor amendments and thus give the Government the ability to act. The present mobilization system should also be sufficient to achieve the required readiness. Maybe a greater portion of active duty officers should be considered. Also the possibility to store all equipment in a centralized location should enhance the ability to meet readiness requirements.

Another possibility is to organize the SWEDRAP with active duty personnel on special contracts. Both officers and soldiers shall be contracted for at least three years allowing the requirements of readiness and deployment abroad. This alternative will probably enhance interoperability and efficiency, especially in environments other than Scandinavian. Enough time must be made available for sufficient training. But what will Sweden do with this unit during periods of no NATO or UN missions, and when they have reached the level of readiness? An active duty unit is very costly even when not deployed. There will probably be no need for them inside Sweden, but with a more active foreign policy the unit might be useful to support this policy. One example could be to train forces in the Baltic States under the umbrella of PfP. An active duty unit will, on the other hand, raise other questions deriving from a mixed system of militia and active units. Shall the active officers rotate between the regular army and the SWEDRAP or shall it be

separate systems? Will this mixed system create an A and a B team? All these questions should be solvable and the outcome together with the financial situation will probably cause a major change in the Swedish Army.

#### Interoperability.

Ideally, the highest degree of interoperability<sup>26</sup> can be achieved if all forces were organized the same, i.e., doctrine, training, equipment, procedures and language are the same. A high degree of interoperability with fully implemented standards is very costly and time consuming to achieve, mainly due to the present organization's inertia. It takes time to change procedures, doctrine and equipment, all has to be planned and executed within the budget and planning procedures for a defense bill and the long term defense planning. NATO has during many years developed interoperability rather well, and many procedures are standard procedures as well as some important equipment are standardized, specifically in the logistic area such as ammunition. NATO Standardization Agreements for procedures and systems and equipment components are called STANAGs.<sup>27</sup> One solution to achieve interoperability could be to train and equip only the SWEDRAP according to NATO standards and not the rest of the Armed Forces. This is possible, but would create less interoperability within the remaining Swedish Army. A balanced solution might be, a gradual modernization and standardization when a major reorganization of the brigade structures has to be done. When standardizing equipment, priority must be given to the communication systems, which is basic to achieve interoperability on lowest level.<sup>28</sup> Also required is to standardize information and its

format transmitted over the communication systems. For example, communicating the position of enemy forces in a recognizable format.

#### The Command Structure.

The SWEDRAP could be used for two types of missions, as a reaction force within NATO, which would be its main mission, or in peace support operations under a UN mandate. In this latter mission the SWEDRAP would fall under the command of NATO or UN. In NATO missions it could be used for collective defense or collective security operations. The latter operation is executed under the mandate from UN and with the command structure of NATO. The basic mission for SWEDRAP is to be Sweden's contribution to NATO's ACE ARRC and primarily be used in Article 5 operations.

The command authorities granted to superior NATO commanders is influenced by a variety of features. A command structure could vary between a NATO command or a non-NATO command. The command authority granted to a commander would depend on the type of mission, type of force to be controlled, the presence of common Roles of Engagement (ROE), a commander's requirement to task organize subordinate units and the likelihood of combat operations. Also important is the degree to which alliance members share a common goal.<sup>29</sup> This is specifically important in non-Article 5 operations where a great ambiguity of the current situation is apparent. Other questions that will influence the transfer of authority are: loss of sovereignty, national ROE are contradictory, fear of a fragmentation of forces, training, national budgets, geographical limitations, logistics and national political decisions.<sup>30</sup>

In the situation when the SWEDRAP is deployed in Article 5 operations the authority transferred should be Operational Command (OPCOM).<sup>31</sup> This means that the commander has the right to reassign forces, deploy units and delegate operational and/or tactical control.

When SWEDRAP is deployed in non-Article 5 operations two distinct command authorities are possible. Peace enforcement missions will probably require OPCOM.<sup>32</sup> Peace enforcement includes combat missions and OPCOM will give the commander enough flexibility to accomplish his missions. It is vital for the commander to have the ability to reassign forces and to deploy units according to the current situation. Also to be considered is the mostly short time to make decisions. All other non-Article 5 operations will require Operational Control (OPCON),<sup>33</sup> a minimum command authority.

In the situation when the SWEDRAP is deployed under the command of UN, Swedish authorities will stay in command until the force has arrived in the area of operation. At this point they will be assigned to the UN commander. He will normally take the operational and tactical command of the force. The UN commander's responsibility for logistics and administration will be specified in the mandate given for actual mission. A special question to be settled between UN and Sweden in this situation is to stipulate how Sweden can withdraw the SWEDRAP in case of a threat against Sweden or any other NATO country.

In all these missions the Swedish Supreme Commander will retain Full Command, thereby retaining responsibility for jurisdiction and discipline.

#### The Decision to Deploy the Force.

The decision to deploy the SWEDRAP for NATO Article 5 operations or non-Article 5 operations can only be taken by the Swedish government after the request from NATO.

If the UN requests Sweden to participate in peace support operations the Swedish Government would have to decide if it will use the SWEDRAP or use other units, specially organized and trained for this mission. The decision whether the special unit or the SWEDRAP shall be used must be based upon time constraints, the type of mission and availability of forces. Normally, the special unit, the SHIRBRIG, 34 should be used. In any case the Swedish Government has to consider these two alternatives within the same political context before the choice. The actual international security situation must be assessed to decide whether the threat situation makes it possible to use the SWEDRAP. The overall political situation might put pressure on the government to keep the SWEDRAP in the country as well as sending the SHIRBRIG force to a peace support mission. This total solution might serve Swedish security and defense policy the best. The Swedish government has to consider both forces as a part of the whole when considering the general political situation.

#### **Conclusion: A Possible Swedish Choice.**

According to its committed security policy, Sweden should have a SWEDRAP consisting of one armored or mechanized brigade with sufficient logistical support for sustained operations within NATO. This force could be an appropriate and substantial contribution to the NATO Rapid Reaction Forces. The SWEDRAP Brigade should be a

part of the Swedish Armed Forces primarily intended for the defense of Sweden and secondly be a rapid reaction force, and as a reaction force be deployed in a Nordic Division. The division headquarters shall be a coalition between contributing countries, with the division commander assigned on rotary basis. The headquarters should be situated in one of the contributing countries considering infrastructure, distances, communication and willingness to provide facilities. The Swedish Supreme Commander will retain Full Command and have the responsibility for jurisdiction and discipline of Swedish Forces. The multinational force commander will have OPCOM or OPCON due to what kind of mission he is assigned. The Swedish Government will have the ultimate decision to deploy the SWEDRAP Brigade.

For UN peace support missions Sweden shall continue to participate in the recently created SHIRBRIG, a High Readiness Brigade available for the UN. Up until now, Sweden has only declared its intention to participate in the SHIRBRIG. Sweden is planning to have a limited ability to participate in operations from January 1998. The Swedish contribution will be one mechanized infantry company and one support company.

Two principal organizations could be considered. The first alternative is to organize the SWEDRAP Brigade with active duty officers and soldiers. The other alternative is to organize the SWEDRAP Brigade with a mix of active duty and reserve officers together with conscript soldiers, all of them on a voluntary basis for three years. The alternative of active duty officers and soldiers on special contracts should be thoroughly investigated

before a final decision. The second alternative is closest to present Swedish Army organization, and might be the most suitable for Swedish conditions and traditions.

The SWEDRAP Brigade shall be possible for use within all the Alliances' territories. This will put a great pressure on Sweden to provide sufficient transportation and logistics. This is a crucial requirement and must be properly solved. Sweden has up until now no experience of deploying brigades outside Sweden and provide sustained presence in combat. Sweden must also learn to train and equip units for combat in other climate and terrain than the Swedish. The SWEDRAP Brigade shall also have the capacity to accomplish all, for a mechanized brigade, normal missions. The equipment has to be based on the standard equipment to keep communality with the rest of the Army and to keep the costs low. Today's mobilization concept is built upon the idea of many decentralized storages to reduce the vulnerability against bombing. A centralized storage for the SWEDRAP Brigade might be considered to enhance the readiness of the equipment. Interoperability might though establish the need for special equipment at least for communication. Also different climate and terrain conditions might require special equipment. Yearly participation in NATO exercises would be essential to enhance interoperability. The exercise could be conducted within a notional Nordic Division.

Organizing, training, equipping and maintaining a relevant readiness of the SWEDRAP Brigade and the Defense Forces will cause a major reorganizing of the Swedish Army to be able to meet the requirements within an unchanged budget. This is a major challenge for Sweden as a future member of NATO.

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#### ENDNOTES.

<sup>1</sup> THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, Washington DC, 4 April 1949. The full preamble reads as follows:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

<sup>2</sup> THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, Washington DC, 4 April 1949. Article 10 reads as follow:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Beslutningsforslag nr B 1. Folketinget 1993-94. Framsent den 6. oktober 1993 af forsvarsministeren (Hans Hækkerup)

RAPPORT OM OPSTILLING MV. AF DEN INTERNATIONALE ENHED. Rapport fra den af Forsvarsministeren den 28. decenber 1992 nedsatte Styrningsgruppe vedrörende den internationale enhed.

<sup>5</sup> In pp 44-45 in the <u>RAPPORT OM OPSTILLING MV. AF DEN INTERNATIONALE ENHED</u> is stated that the units ought to be released after about six months. If the whole Brigade is deployed, this is possible but not recommended, the estimated number of personnel needed to sustain this Brigade over a longer period is stated to be about three times the proposed force.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Page 120 in NATO Handbook.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This information is summarized from the following documents;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> IBID page 44, this is considered as the optimum, without creating negative routines, impartiality etc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> page 3 in Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om etablering af en dansk international brigade.

The information given in the <u>RAPPORT OM OPSTILLING MV. AF DEN INTERNATIONALE</u>

<u>ENHED</u> is a little ambiguous, and both possibilities of having the brigade releasing one battalion each half year and the possibility of other forces releasing the Brigade seems to be possible.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Page 38 in the <u>RAPPORT OM OPSTILLING MV. AF DEN INTERNATIONALE ENHED</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Page 4 in the St meld nr 46 (1993-94). <u>Bruk av norske styrker i utlandet</u>, (use of Norwegian forces abroad).

<sup>11</sup> IBID, Page 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Page 1-3 in Innst. S. nr. 23. (1993-94) <u>Instilling fra forsvarskomiteen om bruk av norske styrker i</u> utlandet.

This proposed change is based upon the Danish suggestion to a new law for the Danish Defense, chapter purpose and mission. Lovforslag nr L 5. Folketinget 1993-94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Appendix 8 in the NATO handbook.

Appendix 9 paragraph 31 in the <u>NATO handbook</u>. The Alliance's strategic concept. Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> IBID paragraph 41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> IBID paragraph 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> IBID paragraph 42.

<sup>19</sup> Se page 6 in MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMAND AUTHORITIES HANDBOOK:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CR-CAST WORKING GROUP ON COMMAND AUTHORITIES REQUIRED

FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER.

In <u>Försvarets Pressmeddelande 1996-12-12</u> is the following information given. The Swedish government has given the Secretary of Defense permission to sign a declaration of intention to organize a multinational High Reaction Brigade. The brigade will be called SHIRBRIG and the contributing countries will be Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden. The SHIRBRIG shall be used in operations according to chapter VI in the UN charter. The readiness shall be 15 to 30 days after

the decision of the Swedish government. The mission is restricted to six months. A permanent planning section will be organized to prepare deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> page 14 in the <u>RAPPORT OM OPSTILLING MV. AF DEN INTERNATIONALE ENHED</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> IBID, page 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Please see note 20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Se page 2 and 3 in Innst. S. nr. 23 (1993-94). <u>Instilling fra forsvarskomiteen om bruk av norske styrker i</u> utlandet.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Page 74 in the RAPPORT OM OPSTILLING MV. AF DEN INTERNATIONALE ENHED.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Interoperability is defined in <u>Joint Pub 5-0</u>, glossary. Extraction: the ability of systems, units or forces to provide service to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. The complete definition is used as a base for further discussions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Page 124 in the NATO Handbook.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Page 125 in the <u>NATO Handbook</u>. ...procurement of communications and electronic equipment with the aim of achieving the maximum degree of standardization and interoperability.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Se page 7 in MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMAND AUTHORITIES HANDBOOK:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CR-CAST WORKING GROUP ON COMMAND AUTHORITIES REQUIRED

FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> IBID, page 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> IBID, definitions of OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM and TACON as in Annex F, page 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> IBID, page 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> IBID, page 13.

<sup>34</sup> see note 20.

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